The Nuclear Regulatory Commission has initiated an important rulemaking on reactor security, for which your comments are critical. A successful terrorist attack on a nuclear facility could release massive radioactivity, capable of producing tens of thousands of immediate deaths and hundreds of thousands of latent cancers, as well as contaminating an area the size of a big state for generations. Yet the NRC is proposing to DO NOTHING to improve the security of the nation's nuclear plants. The proposed rulemaking explicitly is designed to codify the status quo, which is woefully inadequate, with no security upgrades at all from the situation currently in place. Write them to indicate how inappropriate their proposal is, and that security at reactors needs to be dramatically improved.

Background

Since the 1970s, reactors have only been required to protect against a "Design Basis Threat" (DBT) of three external attackers with the possible assistance of one insider. Furthermore, they have not been required to have any protection against air attack.

By contrast, the 9/11 attack involved 19 external attackers, deadly serious, with sophisticated planning (even learning how to fly jumbo jets), and they of course came in by air.

After 9/11, NRC resisted calls from Congress and the public interest community to increase the DBT to at least the number of attackers seen on 9/11 and to include air attack. Instead, it worked out a sweetheart deal with the nuclear industry, in closed door meetings to which the public was excluded, to make only minor changes to the security requirements so as not to burden industry. As TIME Magazine has reported, these changes increased the DBT marginally, from three external attackers to "less than twice" that number.

The revised DBT was issued not by regulation, but by secret Orders, with the public frozen out of the process. Public Citizen sued NRC, asserting it violated the Administrative Procedure Act for cutting a deal in secret with industry and not adopting rules with opportunity for public input. In an effort to avoid the court ruling against it, NRC announced it would commence a rulemaking to address security regulation changes.

Committee to Bridge the Gap had submitted a Petition for Rulemaking to upgrade the DBT to at least the 19 attackers seen on 9/11 and to require construction of "Beamhenge" shields (steel I-beams and cabling at offset distances from reactor buildings so planes would hit the shields, rather than the reactor or spent fuel pools). NRC received over 800 comments, all favorable (with the exception of a handful from industry).

Finally, Congress in the Energy Bill directed NRC to conduct a rulemaking to upgrade security, taking into account the events of 9/11, the potential for attacks by large groups and sophisticated weaponry, and attacks by air.

NRC has chosen to ignore the Congressional mandate, the public comments on the rulemaking petition, and the essence of the laws governing public rulemaking. Instead, it has proposed to adopt a rule that merely codifies the status quo, with no upgrade to current security levels at reactors. The number of attackers to defend against would remain a small fraction of what was seen on 9/11; no protection against air attack would be required. And NRC obscures the fundamental aspects of the rulemaking, so as to make meaningful public comment impossible.

ACTION

Please send in comments to NRC by January 23. Do so by email; by fax to Secretary, NRC at (301) 415-1011, by mail to Secretary, NRC, Washington, DC 20555-0001 att'n: Rulemakings and Adjudications Staff, or on the NRC rulemaking website. Place in the subject line: RIN 3150–AH60.

Suggested points to make are as follows; it is best to put this in your own words:

1. The NRC proposal to make no upgrades to existing security requirements for nuclear facilities is unacceptable in the face of the current terrorist environment and the potential consequences of a successful attack on a nuclear site.
2. 19 attackers were involved in 9/11. It is unacceptable to require protection for only a small fraction of that number.
3. 9/11 involved attacks from the air. It is unacceptable to exempt air attacks from the kinds of threats reactors must be capable of defending against.
4. One supports the Committee to Bridge the Gap Petition for Rulemaking to upgrade reactor security. In particular, there should be protection against at least 19 attackers and construction of "Beamhenge" shields so planes crash into the shields, not the reactor facilities.
5. The rulemaking itself is a violation of rulemaking laws, in that it provides nothing but vague generalities that make genuine comment impossible. Cutting deals in secret with industry and then after the fact letting the public comment without any specifics damages public confidence and public security.
6. Congress ordered NRC to include in any rulemaking consideration of 9/11-level threats, attacks by large groups, and attacks by air. NRC has defied Congress in this rulemaking by failing to consider any of these matters.

Committee to Bridge the Gap